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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 18143 
HOYT GLENNY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with and found guilty 
of forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403, Utah Code Ann., 
1953 as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The prosecution was handled by the Iron County 
Attorney, Mr. James L. Shumate. The Defendant was 
represented by Mr. Scott J. Thorley, who was acting as the 
Iron County Public Defender. The Defendant was convicted 
on October 29, 1981, and was sentenced on December 11, 1981, 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
Utah. The sentence the Defendant received was incarceration 
in the Utah State Prison for a period of time not less 
than five (5) years nor more than his natural life. The 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Defendant is presently incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison upon this same, said conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
" 
The Defendant seeks a reversal of the conviction 
for forcible sodomy in this case. In the alternative, 
if the Court so deems appropriate pursuant to the 
Defendant's position as stated herein, the Defendant seeks 
a remand to the trial Court for a retrial of this caseo 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual situation incident to this case 
transpired in Cedar City, Iron County, Utah, on or about 
July 3, 1981. On that said date, the Defendant was a 
resident of Room #17 of the American Motel. Also, on that 
said date, John Cooper, a thirteen (13) year-old resident 
of Cedar City, Utah, was in the area of the American Motel 
searching for and collecting aluminum cans for recycling. 
John Cooper knocked on the door of Room #17 and the 
Defendant opened the door and invited John Cooper in. John 
Cooper went into the room and after the initial greetings 
and amenities, the Defendant learned that Mr. Cooper was 
collecting aluminum cans, and so he offered John Coop~r 
two six-packs of beer located 1n the refrigerator of the 
rnotelroorn. John Cooper went to the refrigerator, got the 
two six-packs of beer, drank one of the cans, and kept the 
-2-
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remainder pursuant to the agreement. A discussion was also 
made whereby the Defendant offered John Cooper some money 
if he, John Cooper, would run an errand to the Lunt Motel 
where the Defendant had left some clothes and possessions, 
and retrieve same for the Defendant. John Cooper then left 
. 
the American M6tel and went to the Lunt Motel, but was 
unable to obtain the clothes and possessions of the Defendant 
and so he returned to Room #17 of the American Motel, went 
in and informed the Defendant of what had transpired. 
At this point, the testimony of the prosecution witness, 
John Cooper, and that of the Defendant, Hoyt Glenny, begin 
to significantly differ. 
John Cooper testified as follows. That when 
John Cooper returned to Room #17, he was again invited in, 
but the Defendant shut the door behind him. The Defendant 
then gave John Cooper $5.00 for the errand that he had run. 
The Defendant then asked John Cooper to come over to the 
chair upon which he was sitting. John Cooper then sat on 
the Defendant's lap and the Defendant kissed him on the lips. 
After that, the Defendant started to rub John Cooper's penis 
through the long pants and underwear John Cooper was w~aring. 
Then the Defendant slipped the underwear down and started 
rubbing the penis directly. At the Defendant's request, 
John Cooper got up and sat on the bed, and was apparently 
-3-
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joined by the Defendant on the bed. On the bed, the 
Defendant held John Cooper down by pushing him down on the 
chest. John Cooper stated, "he put his mouth to it", 
(T.T. P. 56, L28). After that, John Cooper stated, "he~ 
started just putting his mouth--started rubbing my penis 
again", (T. T. P·. 57, Ls. 16, 17). After that, the prosecutor 
asked John Cooper the question of, "was it while you were 
on the bed that he put his mouth on your penis?" (T.T. P. 57, 
Ls.21,22). In response to that question, John Cooper 
responded, nYes." (Tc T. PG 57, L23). After that, on cross-
examination, the defense counsel asked John Cooper, "Okay. 
And then he asked you if there had been any contact between 
Mr. Glenny's mouth and your penis, isn't that right?'' (T.T. 
P. 62, Ls.17, 18., 19). In response to this question, John 
Cooper stated, "Yes". (T.T. P:.62, L20)~ After that, also 
on cross-examination, the defense counsel asked, ''Okay. And 
then didn't you tell him that you were--that he was sitting 
in the chair when he put his mouth to your--an~ you used the 
word, 'dick', is that right?" (T.T. P. 67, Ls.27, 28, 29). 
·In response to that question, John Cooper stated, "Yes". 
(T.T. P. 67, L30). At no point in the trial transcrie~ did 
the prosecution witness, John Cooper, testify that his penis 
was inserted in or into the mouth of the Defendant. 
At the point that John Co~per returned to Room #17 
-4-
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of the American Motel, the Defendant, Hoyt Glenny, testified 
as follows. Upon John Cooper's return to Room #17 of the 
American Motel after running his errand, the Defendant paid 
John Cooper $2.00 for running the errand. Upon John Cooper's 
return, the Defendant was fairly well intoxicated, being he 
. 
had been sipping whiskey, but that his memory of the entire 
matter was clear. After John Cooper was paid the money for 
doing his errand, the Defendant invited him to come over and 
sit down on his lap. John Cooper then complied and the 
Defendant kissed John Cooper on the forehead below the hair-
line. That at no time did the Defendant touch his lips to 
any other part of John Cooper's body. Also, neither John 
Cooper or the Defendant were on the bed at any time. The 
Defendant also,···testified that he has emphysema and as a 
result, walking and breathing of the Defendant is extremely 
difficult. Irt fact, taking the ten to fifteen steps 
necessary would have been very difficult. The Defendant did 
also never open up the pants or unzip or lower the underwear 
of John Cooper. The Defendant also stated that at the time 
John Cooper was sitting on his lap, he placed his hand on 
John Cooper's thigh in a gesture of "thanks-a-lot". 
It is interesting to note that John Cooper testified 
that the Defendant had his mouth on the penis of John Cooper 
for just a few seconds. (T.T. P. 57, 126). 
-5-
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For the purposes of argument herein, the 
factual situation as brought forth by the Respondent, State 
of Utah, will be deemed the correct factual situation. 
This is done solely for the purpose of viewing the evidence 
in the best light of the prosecution, and in no way is an 
admittance that the facts as propounded by the Respondent, 
State of Utah, are correct. The Defendant will attempt to 
show that even though the facts of the case are brought 
forth in the best light for the prosecution, the Defendant 
should still prevail in this action. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE HAS PROVEN 
THE CRIME OF SODOMY. 
As can be seen in the facts as reiterated above, 
the transcript is positive that the Defendant's mouth was 
on the penis of John Cooper, or to the penis of John 
Cooper, or that there was contact between the Defendant's 
mouth and John Cooper, but at no point is there any 
evidence that the penis was inserted 1n or into the mouth 
of the Defendant. 
The Defendant was charged under a Utah 
sodomy statute, Section 76-5-403, Utah Code Ann., 1953 
-6-
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as amended, which is as follows, to-wit: 
A person commits sodomy when he engages 
in any sexual act involving the genitals 
of one person and the mouth or annus of 
another person, regardless of the sex of 
either participant. 
A person commits forcible sodomy when he 
commits sodomy upon another without the 
other's consent. 
Sodomy is a class B misdemeanor. Forcible 
sodomy is a felony of the second degree 
unless the victim is under the age of 14, 
in which case the offense is punishable 
as a felony of the first degree. 
The statute, however, as well as the entire 
Utah Code Annotated, fails to define what sodomy is. In 
Black's Law Dictionary, sodomy is defined as the carnal 
copulation of human beings in other than the natural 
manner. This definition is, however, not the definition 
that Utah has followed. The Utah Supreme Court has 
deferred to the common law definition of sodomy in the 
case of State of Utah v. Johnson, 137 P.632, 44 Utah 18, 
(Utah 1913}. In that case, the Court reversed a sodomy 
conviction because the sexual contact was between the 
Defendant's mouth and that of a penis. On page 632 of 
137 Pacific Reporter, the Court states that they must look 
to and be governed by the common law definition of sodomy. 
The Utah legislature in 1923 amended the former sodomy 
statute, Section 76-53-22 Utah Code.Ann., to include 
-7-
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the use of the mouth. Then, in the 1933 case of the 
State of Utah v. Peterson, 17 P.2d 925, 81 Utah 340 
(Utah 1933), the Court solidified the legislative enactment 
by sust~ining a conviction of sodomy that included 
copulation in the mouth. In the Peterson case, the element 
. 
of penetration ~as proved as the facts were stipulated to 
be as stated on page 926 as follows: 
On September 8, 1931, at Salt Lake 
county , state of Utah, the defendant 
Clyde Peterson "inserted his sexual 
organ, to-wit, his penis into the 
mouth of Elaine Giles; 
The element of penetration was proven in the Peterson case 
by the use of the word, into. 
In sodomy, mere contact is not enough. People 
v. Angier, 112 P .. Zd 659, (Cal App. 1941). For a conviction 
of sodomy, a necessary element that needs tc be proven is 
penetration. U.S. v. Milby, 400 F.2d 702, C.A.,(Kentucky 
1968); State v. Pratt, 309 A.2d 864 (Maine 1973); State v. 
Swain, 172 So.2d 3, (Florida 1965); State v. Shambo, 322 P.2d 
657, (Montana 1958); State v. Withrow, 96 S.E.2d 913, (West 
Virginia 1957); State v. Whittmore, 122 S.E.2d 396, (North 
Carolina 1961); Cole v. State, 179 P.2d 176, (Oklahoma 1947); 
Commonwealth v. Yingling, 19 Cambria 142, (Pennsylvania 1951): 
People v. Hickok, 216 P.2d 140, (California 1950); People v. 
Ramos, 270 P.Zd 540, (California 1954). 
-8-
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Case law is replete with examples. In the case of 
Commonwealth v. Althoff, 16 D & C 2d 640, (Pennsylvania 1949), 
the Defendant undressed his young son, turned the boy on 
his stomach, got on top of the boy_ and moved up and down in 
an apparent attempt at sex, but could not penetrate because 
the Defendant was in a drunken state. The Court held there 
was no penetration, therefore there was no sodomy. In the 
case of State v. Alkhowarizmi, 421 P.2d 871, 101 Ariz. 514, 
(Arizona 1966), a policeman came upon a truck at night and 
turned his flashlight on two male suspects in the back of the 
truck. The policeman testified that both males were lying 
down in close proximity to one another, that their trousers 
an~ shorts were pulled down so as to expose their private 
parts, t~at at least one of the men had an erection and that 
~~; :. 
the officer obser~ed what appeared to be a moist milky-white 
substance on one of the men's leg. The Court held that 
there was no proof of penetration, therefore, there could 
be no conviction of sodomy. In the case of State v. Williams, 
580 P.2d 1341, 224 Kan. 468, (Kansas 1978), the Defendant's 
penis penetrated the lips of the complaining witness, 
although further penetration was prevented by clenched 
teeth. The Court held that this was penetration to sustain 
a conviction of sodomy. In another case, State v. Elliott, 
557 P.2d 1105, 89 N.M. 756, (New Mexico 1978), the Court 
-9-
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held that any penetration, however slight, proves this 
element that is essential for the crime of sodomyo 
In another case, the touching of a female sex organ with the 
mouth or tongue of the Defendant did not constitute 
penetration. State v. Olsen, 258 P.2d 810, (Washington 1953). 
In the case of ·state v. Hill, 176 So. 719, 179 Miss. 732, 
(Mississippi 1937), the Court held that where the Defendant 
male "sucked the private sexual parts" of the female 
prosecution witness, there was no penetration, and hence, 
there was no case of sodomy. 
By the above, it can be seen that in the case at 
hand, there was a failure of the prosecution to prove 
penetration which 1s a necessary and proper element to prove 
the.crime of sodo1!.1Y· There is no riebate, that pursuant to 
~~ 
the 1923 Utah statutory enactment and the 1933 Peterson case, 
sexual contact by the mouth of one to the sexual organ of 
another can also be sodomy, but because the common law 
definition still prevails, there is no sodomy in the case at 
hand. 
ISSUE II 
WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE TO RECORD 
THE CLOSING ARGUMENTS OF THE ATTORNEYS 
WAS ERROR WARRANTING A REVERSAL OF THE 
CASE. 
Both Mr. James L. Shumate, Attorney for the 
prosecution, and Mr. Scott J. Thorley, Attorney for the 
-10-
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Defendant, presented their closing arguments to the jury, 
but for some reason not brought forth in the transcript, 
these closing arguments were not reported. (T.T. P. 98, 
Ls. 18, 19, 20). The attorneys are entitled to a reasonable 
measure of latitude in closing remarks to the jury. State 
v. Herrera, 499 P.2d 364, 84 N.M. 46, certiorari denied 
499 P.2d 355, 84 N.M. 37, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 918, 
409 U.S. 1110, 34 L.Ed.2d 692, (New Mexico 1972). This right 
of argument to the jury contemplates a liberal freedom of 
speech and wide range of discretion, illustration, and 
enumeration. Cervantes }l.~St'at~>,-~556 P.Zd 622, (Oklahoma 
1976). Utah has also adhered to this latter-mentioned 
proposition. State v. Valdez, 513 P.Zd 422, 30 Utah 2d 54, 
(Utah 1973). However,· there are limitations. In State V . , ... ~· .. .'' . ' 
;;..:_. 
... . . •• :.t· :i.~ 
·' 
Randall, 443 P.2d 434, (Arizona 1968), ·the Court held that 
the prosecution rebuttal argument should contain itself to 
answering issues brought out in the argument of the defense 
and should serve no other purpose. The scope of the closing 
argument should not be unduly restricted. People v. Lundy, 
533 P.2d 920, 188 Colo. 194, (Colorado 1975). In a criminal 
case, the purpose of argument is not merely a discuss~on 
of the facts and any limitation of the argument is to 
deprive the Defendant to the right to have his counsel make 
the proper argument and discussion of the application of 
the laws to the facts shown to exist. State v. Gilbert, 
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142 P.2d 584, 65 Idaho 210, (Idaho 1943). It is also 
improper for an attorney to argue legal theories to a Jury 
when the jury has not been instructed on those theories. 
Lloyd v. State, 576 P.2d 740, (Nevada 1978). In the Lloyd 
case, which was a rape ·prosecution, the trial Court properly 
prohibited counsel from instructing the jury in the closing 
argument, on alternative theories of law relating to rape. 
A Court has also held that it is error for an attorney to 
define the term, 11 reasonable doubt" when the Court has 
failed to do so. Gresham v. State, 396 P.Zd 374, (Oklcihoma 
1964). Another case held that statements by the 
prosecution or the defense to the jury upon law, must be 
combined to the law as set forth in the instructions. 
State v. Estill, 492 P.2d 1037_, 80 Wash. 2nd 196, (Washington 
1972) .. Where a prosecutor repeatedly rnistated the law and 
implanted in the jury an erroneous conception which 
prejudiced the Defendant, a fair trial under certain 
circumstances may have been denied. Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 
1150, (Wyoming 1978). The argument of counsel is to be 
confined to the questions that are at issue \-and evidence 
relating thereto. State v. Irving, 538 P.2d 670, 217 Kan. 
735, (Kansas 1975). The Oklahoma Court has said that a 
prosecuting attorney should confine his arguments before a 
jury to fair discussions of issues in the case, and improper 
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remarks objected to will be considered and construed in 
reference to the evidence. If it appears that the improper 
argument may have determined the verdict, judgment will be 
reversed. Harvell v. State, 395 P.2d 331, (Oklahoma 1964). 
It is also improper for an attorney to argue matters which 
were not or could have not been introduced into evidence. 
State v. Smith, 561 P.2d 739, 114 Ariz. 415 (Arizona 1977). 
The Arizona Cburt has also held that reference 1n an ~rgument 
to the jury to anything not legally admissable against the 
Defendant is highly improper and can justify a reversal. 
State v. Harden, 406 P.2d 406, 99 Ariz. 56, (Arizona 1965). 
Another Court reversed a conviction where the prosecution 
theory of the robbery in question was wholly speculative 
and unsupported by evidence. The argument being by· inuendo 
and conjecture , that the victim was rnurdere~ as a result of 
an attempted robbery by the poverty-stricken Defendant. 
Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204, 178 Colo. 38, (Colorado 1972). 
In another Court, the prosecution's closing argument in a 
sodomy case that, because the Defendant had previously been 
imprisoned where d_eviant sexual practices are common, the 
jury could infer the Defendant's guilt of the crime~o~ 
sodomy. This was highly improper and was reversable error. 
Soap v. State, 562 P.2d 889, (Oklahoma 1977). In addition, 
it has been held that a prosecutor must exercise care in 
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addressing the jury during argument and must avoid 
references to personal opinion and irrelevant material. 
State v. Smoot, 590 P.Zd 1001, 99 Idaho 854, (Idaho 1978)0 
A~cord State v. Murrell, 585 P.Zd 1017, 224 Kan. 689, (Kansas 
1978). 
Utah has also decided upon this issue. In the 
case of State v. Trusty, 502 P.Zd 113, 28 Utah 2d 317, 
(Utah 1972), the Court held that any comment by a prosecutor 
which in a substantial way impairs or disparrages the right 
of the Defendant to claim the privilege as improper. That if 
there is a possibility that the comment prejudiced the 
Defendant in a sense that there is any likelihood that there 
may have been a different result, the error should be deemed 
prejudicial· and another trial shoµld be granted. However, 
the converse is also true, unless both propositions are 
affirmatively shown, there should be no reversal. The 
determination of those propositions is properly within the 
discretion of the trial Courto The trial Court's decision 
will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion. 
However, the Supreme Court must be able to· be in a position 
to know what was said so that it can analyze same. St~te v. 
Black, 551 P.Zd 518, (Utah 1976). 
Even more in point is the case of In Interest of 
Trotter, 598 P.2d 557, (Kansas 1979). That case held the 
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failure of the trial Court to provide either a Court 
Reporter or electronic equipment to record proceedings or 
to keep adequate notes itself from which a Record on Appeal 
may be prepared, constitutes an abuse of discretion entitling 
a party to a new trial. In a New York case, the trial 
Court committed· error directing that the summation be had 
in a trial in the absence of the presiding Justice and 
· ....... -... 
the official stenographer. The Court held that the judgment 
be reversed and a new trial be granted. It is interesting 
to note that this case is a civil case, and not a criminal 
case whereby the standards would be even more strict. This 
latter-mentioned case is Aronson v. Bass, 229 N.Y.S. 201, 
(New York 1928). 
It can be easily seen from all~of the above cases 
that a closing argument and ·what 1s sa.id therein is of 
significant import. In the case at hand·, because of factors 
unknown to all, no transcript of the closing arguments was 
made. Because the trial Court Judge has full and absolute 
control over trial Court proceedings, it can only be assumed 
that through the inadvertence, neglect, or negligence of the 
trial Court, the closing arguments were not recorded s9 that 
judgment can be passed upon the contents thereof by the 
Utah Supreme Court. We need not be put into a position of 
speculating as to what was said in the closing arguments. 
-15-
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Hence, a reversal or at least a reversal and remand is 
very much. in order based upon this issue alone. 
ISSUE III 
WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF THE 
DEFENDANT FROM THE COURTROOM DURING 
JURY SELECTION WAS ERROR . 
. 
The record includes much dialogue between the 
Court, the prosecutor and the defense counsel in regards 
to the Defindant's condition and the Defendant's absence 
from the Courtroom during the selection of the jury. 
(T.T. P. 2, L.30). (T.T. P. 3, Ls.1-30). (T.T. P. 4, 
Ls~l-30)o (T.T. P. 5, Ls.l-23)G During these discussions, 
the prosecutor and the defense counsel both concluded 
without any evidence or testimony to substantiate· same, 
that the Defendant)· was substantially· intoxicated at the 
commencement of the trial. At that time the Defendant was 
incarcerated .1n the jail which is in close proximity to the 
Courtroom. The Court also made the conclusion that the 
Defendant was intoxicated and jumped to the conclusion 
that·the Court should commence the trial without the 
Defendant at least through the jury selection. 
The prosecutor cited as authority to allow 
the trial to commence without the Defendant 77-35-17. 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(Erroneously cited in the Record as 17-35-17). The prosecutor 
' -16-
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stated that he relied upon sub-paragraph (2) that allegedly 
justified the Defendant's absence from the triai. The 
proper portions of this said statute are as follows: 
In all cases the defendant shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person .Jnd 
by counsel. The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the 
following exceptions: 
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable 
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence 
from the trial after notice to defendant 
of the time for trial shall not prevent the 
case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same 
effe'ct as if defendant had been present; 
This sub-paragraph (2) states that the Defendant's absence 
must·be voluntary and requires notice to the Defendant. 
First of all, it is not even known that the Defendant 
was intoxicated, it was only presumed. Therefore, without 
evidence or testimony, there is no way of knowing if the 
Defendant's absence was voluntary. Then in addition, there 
was no notice given to the Defendant. Consequently, the 
prosecutor, the defense counsel and the Court are all in 
error in allowing this matter to proceed and the JUry be 
selected without the presence of the Defendant. 
A Defendant's right to be present lTI the 
Courtroom at all stages of the trial 15 a basic right guarantee( 
-17-
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by the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States 
Constitutiono State v. Carver, 496 P.Zd-676, 94 Idaho 677, 
(Idaho 1972). The Carver case went on to state that the 
purpose of having an accuse~ present at trial is to insure 
t: 11at he has first hand knowledge of the actions taken which 
lead to the ev~ntual outcome of the trial. It is particularly 
important that he knows how the jurors who decided the facts 
were- selected. Ac.cord State v. Musgrove, 582 P. 2d 1246, 
(\iontana 1978); Hanley v. State, 434 P.2d 440, (Nevada 1967). 
There are cases that discuss the facts thar would 
justify the Defendant's waiver of his right to be present. 
In State v. Corriz, 522 P.Zd 793, 86-N .. M. 246, (New Mexico 1974) 
the Court held that where the· Defendant's conduct in the 
Courtroom on?~ the first day of trial was obscene and disruptive, 
; 
the trial.Court could exclude him from the trial. In 
an~ther case, another Defendant who was proceeding pro se 
refused to enter the Courtroom, resisted attempts by 
deputies to be placed in there, and was subsequently placed 
by force 1n a nearby room where he could hear proceedings 
and at all times was free to attend the trial if he so chose; 
the Defendant thereby waived his right to be present ~t trial. 
Parker v. State, 5Sq P.2d 1298, (Oklahoma 1976). The same 
result would be where the Defendant was giving admonitions and 
chanting, which interrupted the pro~eedings, the trial Court 
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could exclude the Defendant from the Courtroom during trial. 
State v. Williams, 501 P.2d 328,11 Or.App. 227, (Oregon 1972). 
The Utah legislature felt that the presence of the 
Defendant at trial was so important that they passed the 
statute requ1r1ng same. Section 77-27-3, Utah Code Ann., 
1953 as amended· states as follows: 
If the prosecution is for a felony, the 
defendant must be personally present it 
the trial, but if for a misdemeanor, the 
trial may be had in the absence of the 
defendant; if, however, his presence is 
necessary for the purpose of identification, 
the court may, upon application of the 
pros.ecuting attorney, by an order or 
warran~ require the personal attendance 
of the defendant at the trial. 
This said statute utilizes the word, "must" and hence, it 
can only be ~oncluded that the Defendant's presence at trial 
,:;:{> ~:,..;r.Wk.-r· · f f:J.~·~~~,~H.~. 
is .. maiidato.ry. However, Utah has held that a Defendant who 
absconds in the middle of his trial 1s an exception to the 
rule. State v. Myers, 508 P.2d 41, 29 Utah Zd 254, (Utah). 
In the case of State v. Mannion, 57 P. 542, 19 Utah SOS, 
45 L.R.A. 638, 75 Am. St. Rep. 753, (Utah), the trial Court 
was held to have committed reversable error by denying the 
defendant who was convicted of assault with intent to rape 
his six-year-old daughter, when during the trial, after the 
prosecutrix had said that she was "afraid to tell" because 
of the Defendant, the Court ordered the Defendant to a place 
in the Courtroom where the prosecutrix couid not see him 
-19-
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and he could not hear her testimony. Another Utah case has 
stated that the entitlement of the accused to both his and 
his attorney's presence at a critical stage of criminal 
proceedings is an inviolate right. The denial of that right 
means that injury to the accused is conclusively presumed 
. 
and the Supreme· Court must reverse the lower Court conviction. 
State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343, certiorari denied, 99 S.Ct. 
219, (Utah 1977).. In addition, the Myers case mentioned ab(.1-li"P. 
passed judgment upon the immediately above-mentioned statute 
and by case law reiterated that the Defendant must be 
personally presentJat trial . 
.... ~)Ill' 
The fundamental right of the accused to be present 
at his trial at all stages of the proceedings includes the 
right of the Defendant to be present in such a physical and 
mental condition as to be able to comprehend the nature of 
the proceedings and to assist in his own defense. State v. 
Hancock, 426 P.2d 872, 247 Or. 21, (Oregon 1967). In 
addition, the Defendant should be present when there occurs 
something which concerns his case and about ~hich he might 
possibly either take action or make practical suggestions. 
State v. Carcerano, 390 P.2d 923, 238 Or. 208, certiorari 
denied 85 S.Ct~ 921, 380 U.S. 923, 13 L.Ed.2d 807, (Oregon 
1964). An important case in Utah has held that not only 
does the Defendant have a right and duty to be present at all 
-20-
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,1 ~ 
. J'.I~ 
stages of the trial, but the Defendant should also be present 
where any communication between the Judge and Jury takes 
place. State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58, (Utah 1978). The trial 
transcript is replete with communications between the Court 
and the Jury outside the presence of the Defendant . 
. 
In view of all of the above, it appears like 
again we have an issue that in and of itself would justify 
a reversal of a conviction. Even in the lightest interpreta-
tion, a reversal would be justified because a remand to the 
trial Court as to the- reason for the Defendant's absence is 
now moot. Also correlated with this issue is the fact 
that the trial Court had the obligation to make an inquiry 
as to the nature of the~Defendant's absence, but failed to 
do: this also. Consequently1.~~this,. too, would.~be a sole and 
!!~-:.~~~ ~ ~-, t"; ~~· ;/~ ~.-'.-~ .. ~: .. ,· -~ .... ~~s~ .. -~-~~:--. ;;:::· ~ . c: ~:; : .:·~ 
separate reason for a reversal. 
ISSUE IV 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DUTY TO 
INQUIRE INTO THE TESTIFYING CAPACITY 
OF THE STATE'S PROSECUTING WITNESS 
WHO WAS A MINOR MALE CHILD. 
Throughout the transcript, there are references 
to the testimony of John Cooper and there is a large 
amount of testimony by John Cooper himself. There is no 
question that John Cooper was thirteen years of age at 
the time of the trial. The question that comes to mind is 
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to whether John Cooper was mature enough to understand the 
consequences and import of his testimony. In the case of 
State v. Morasco, 128 P. 571, (Utah 1912), a six-year-old 
boy was the State's prime witness in a case involving an 
assault with intent to commit the crime against nature. At 
. 
that time, there was a 1907 law in effect that precluded 
children under ten-years-of-age from becoming witnesses. 
However, the boy was questioned as to whether he knew what 
it was to tell the truth and to tell a lie. The boy also 
was aware that he will ·be punished if he tells a lie and 
that God wants him to tell the truth. Because of the 
response to these questions, the Court made a determination 
that the boy was capable of testifying as a competent 
witness. The Court held that·whether or not a child p6ssesses 
the necessary qualifications to testify is for the trial 
Court to determine in the exercise of its sound discretion. 
In the absence of an abuse of this discretion, the ruling 
will not be disturbed on appeal. In the case at hand, it 
is true that the prosecuting witness is thirteen-years-of-age, 
but the fact stands that he is still a minor child under 
the .definition of the law. However, absolutely no inquiry 
as to whether or not the child possessed the necessary 
qualifications to testify were made by the Court. It can 
therefore be inferred that the Court concluded John Cooper 
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was a competent witness without ·any inquiry into his 
competency. Consequently,. the inaction of the Court 1s 1n 
direct contravention to the standards set up in the 
Morasco case. The same standard as set out in the Morasco 
case was further solidified and reiterated in the case of 
.. 
State v. MacMiYlan, 145 P. 833, (Utah 1915). In the 
MacMillan case, the Defendant was on trial for taking 
indecent· liberties with a child between seven and eight-years-
of-age. On page 835, the Court reiterated the necessity of 
the Court to utilize its sound discretion in making this 
determination as follows: 
The question of -=-the competency of a child 
who-is called as a-witness, in the very 
na ture:~~of -things', '~must;;!·to :a large>:extentt{~ · ~. 
at '~le~ast, be ··lce:ft- to -- the>0sound discretion'',. ·: .-
of,. ~t~e'":;triaL~~~~tqur~-~,'};::::Wli:~~"that· co~rt\'·has:: ~;~1r· 
passed~upon ;th~;, ~~ue:sticrn~rei the'i· way·,~~{:we ·:._,._ 
cannot inter£~~e., .:unless ··it is cl.early :;f;_~i 
made ."to appe.a-f1;:;that -the.~icourt abused the 
discretion vested in it. 
In yet another Utah case, State v. Zeezich, 210 P. 927, 
(Utah 192.2), the .prosecution witness was an eight-year-old 
girl. In this case, on voir dire_ e~amination, it was 
illicited ·from the girl that she not only knew what it 15 
to tell the truth and what it 15 to tell a lie, but she 
• 
also knew that if she told a lie she would be punished. 
The girl further testified to the fact that her mother and 
·the District Attorney-had-instructed her to tell the 
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truth. Again, a serious inquiry was made into the capacity 
of the prosecuting witness to adequately testify. The only 
inquiry that was made in the case at hand was made_ by the 
defense counsel as to the competency of John Cooper. 
Mr. Thorley asked if John Cooper understood the importance of 
telling the truth in the situation and asked whether or not 
he had told the truth. However, no other inquiry ~as made 
as to whether or not he understood the distinction between a 
truth and a lie and not~ing in the record shows that John 
Cooper had the capacity to rece1\·e impressions of the facts 
as required in the Morasco case. 
Accordingly, because the Court made no such 
inquiry into the capacity to testify of John Cooper, the 
conviction shoutd be overturned and reversed or should at 
least be remanded to the trial Court for an adequate inquiry 
thereto. 
ISSUE V 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GI\.E 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY OVER AND ABOVE 
THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE GIVEN IN ORDER 
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF SODOMY. 
The record indicates that several instructions 
were given to the jury. One instruction was on the 
presumption of innocence of the Defendant. Another 
instruction was on reasonable doubt. Another instruction 
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was on two reasonable interpretations. Yet, another 
instruction was on forcible sodomy and another instruction 
was on the consent to sodomy. Finally, there was an 
instruction that to find the Defendant guilty of forcible 
sodomy, the Jury must find the following: (1) That the 
. 
offense, if any, occured at and within Iron County, State 
of Utah; (2) That the offense, if any, occured on or about 
July 3, 1981, although the exact date is immaterial; (3) That 
at said time and place the said Defendant, Hoyt Glenny, 
did engage in a sexual act involving his mouth and the penis 
of John Cooper; and (4) That at said time John Cooper was 
under the age of fourteen years. 
In Dougherty v. State, 471 P.2d 212, 86 Nev. 507, 
(Nevada 1970), the Court held that accurate instructions 
upon the ·basic elements of the offense charge is essential 
and failure to instruct as to those elements constitutes 
reversable error. There was no instruction given on 
penetration. Yet penetration is a requisite element of the 
crime of sodomy as can be seen from the law and argument 
brought forth in Issue I above. The obligation 1s one 
that is placed directly upon the shoulders of the Court, and 
:;_, 
not of counsel for the parties. People v. Campbell, 589 
P. 2d 1360, (Colorado 1978). 
In the case of State v. Zeezich, supra, 
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the jury was instructed by the Court to examine the testimony 
of the child with care and caution on account of her tender 
years and susceptibility to wrong impressions concerning 
facts. In the case of State v. Dixon, 199 P.2d 775, (Utah 
1948), the prosecution witness was a boy under six-years-of-
A 
ageo Again, as in the Zeezich case, the trial Court gave 
a cautionary instruction calling the jury's attention to the 
fa~t that the boy was of tender years. In accordance with 
that necessity of .instruction to the Jury, the State v. Morasco 
case supra, also gave an instruction that the testimony of 
the minor should be examined with caution because of his 
age and unfamiliarity with the subject matter under 
investigation and that children are susceptible to impressions 
oftentimes erroneous. In the case at hand, no ~autionary 
instructions were given as in these three immediately 
above-mentioned cases. 
It is because of the lack of the two 
instructions, one on penetration and the other a cautionary 
instruction as to the testimony of a child, that the trial 
Court has erred enough to warrant a reversal of the 
conviction previously sustained. 
ISSUE VI 
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED 
EFFECTIVE COUNSEL. 
There are several issues incident to the 
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acts and/or omissions of Mr. Scott J. Thorley, Attorney 
for the Defendant, in the trial Court. These issues 
could all be treated independently but they all appear to 
eminent from the advocacy, or lack of advocacy as the case 
may be, of Mr. Thorley. First of all, a change of venue 
from Iron County to a more liberal venue, such as Salt 
Lake County, should have been at least attempted by counsel. 
Because of the greater concentration of citizens 1n rural 
Utah counties who are against the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, as well as the inordinate amount of influence 
that the prosecutor had w1th the various jurors because of 
his contact with them and their knowledge of him, the 
Defendant most probably would have £aired much better in· a 
venue.~~ such as Salt Lake County. Secondly;_ because of the 
testimony illicited from the Defendant, as· to. his drinking 
alcoholic bevera-ges, the defense counsel should have made 
a voir dire examination of the jury as to how they felt 
about persons who imbibe in alcoholic beverages, coupled 
with an inquiry as to whether or not they could be fair and 
impartial towards an imbiber. Thirdly, it appears that 
the defense counsel himself concluded that the Defendant 
was intoxicated without having any evidence presented 
that would substantiate this conclusion. It was at least 
partially because of the defense counsel's representations 
-2 7-. 
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as to the Defendant's intoxication that the Judge concluded 
intoxication to be true, which ultimately resulted in the 
Defendant's absence during the jury selection. Fourthly, 
the defense counsel could have insisted upon a continuance 
so as to effect the presence of the Defendant at all stages 
~ 
of the proceedings. Fifthly, the defense counsel only met 
with the Defendant briefly prior to the trial and it is 
highly questionable whether the brief encounter time was 
enough to actively prepare for trial. See the Affidavit of 
the Defendant, Hoyt Glenny, that is attached hereto and is 
hereby incorporated by reference as though set forth fu~ly 
herein. Sixthly, it has been established by interviews with 
the Defendant's present counsel, Mr. Stephen Mark Stephens, 
that~he Defendant has had no sexual urges or drives for at 
least ten to fifteen years prior to July 3, 1981, and that 
the said Defendant has been a hard-core alcoholic for at 
least twenty years prior to July 3, 1981. It is submitted 
that not only should the prior counsel have illicited these 
important facts, but that they should have been brought up 
at the time of trial. See the Affidavit of Hoyt Glenny 
attached hereto. Seventhly, there was a need for an expert 
~ 
witness to testify that hard-drinking alcoholics often 
lose their sex drives as a result of the alcoholism. All of 
the above on the surface may appear to be Monday-morning-
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quarterbacking, but an in-depth review of the case law 
indicates that the Courts have given much import to the 
competence of a defense counsel in a criminal case and 
there are basic standards that have to be met, and if they 
are not met, the Defendant has not been adequately 
represented in the trial Court. 
In the case of Reece v. Georgia, 76 S.Ct. 167, 
350 U.S. 85, (United States 1955), the Court held that the 
effective assistance of counsel in a criminal case is a 
constitutional requirement of due process which no member of 
the Union can disregard. The Reece case cited as authority 
and embellished upon the most famous case of Powell v. 
Alabama, 53 S.Ct. SS, 287 U.S. 45, (United States 1932). 
The Powell case, amongst other things, reiterated the rule 
that the right of the accused to assistance of counsel 
includes the right of assistance from the time of 
arraignment up to the preparation for trial as well as 
thereafter. Powell also held that attorneys, beings they 
are officers of the Court, are bound to render service when 
required by appointment as counsel for the accused. It 
is to be noted that the Reece case included the element of 
effectiveness to this necessity of counsel. In the case of 
Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 FR2d 30, Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, (United States 1962), the Pefendant petitioned for 
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a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the United States District Court 
which was dismissed, and the Court herein, the Court of 
Appeals, granted the Petition being it showed the existence 
-
of substantial defenses on behalf of the Defendant who had 
been convicted of first-degree murder and they were 
sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the Defendant had 
been denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. 
Again, the Court talked in terms of the Defendant being denied 
the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. 
In Utah, the claim of inadequacy or effectiveness 
of counsel must be established by the record that counsel 
was ignorant of the facts of the law resulting in the with-
drawal of a crucial defense and reducing the trial to a farce 
and sham. State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, (Utah 1976). 
Also, Utah has held that counsel is required to possess 
ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to members of his 
profession, but he is not required to know all of the law 
nor to second-guess the trial Judge. Young v. Bridwell, 
437 P.Zd 686, (Utah 1968). Another Utah case has held that 
there is an implie~ covenant in an attorney's relationship 
with his client that he will represent the client's 
interest with competence and diligence. Dunn v. McKay, 
584 P.2d 894, (Utah 1978). Another case held that a 
defense counsel who failed to do anymore investigating of a 
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murder charge against the Defendant than to interview 
the prisoner failed to render effective assistance of 
counsel. That on remand, the Defendant would have the 
burden of showing the existence of admissable evidence 
which could have been uncovered by reasonable investigation 
and would have proved helpful at the original trial. 
However, if the changed circumstances made it impossible for 
the Defendant to produce any helpful evidence, the burden 
would shift to the prosecution to show the absence of any 
prejudice because of the inadequacy of counsel. McQueen 
v. Swenson, 498 ·F.2d 207, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
(United States 1974). 
Because there are at least seven maJor factors 
involving the ineffectiveness of the trial Court's defense 
~oun~el as enumerated above, th~re is significant reason 
and proof that because of the acts and omissions of the 
Defendant's counsel, there should either be a reversal 
or a reversal and remand for a new trial. The decisions 
above-mentioned requiring the standard of effective counsel 
make this so. 
CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the~facts and law and 
argument enumerated above, the Defendant is entitled to 
a reversal of the conviction of sod~my. In the alternative, 
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a reversal and remand may be necessary pursuant to what 
has been set forth abovee In any event, the present 
conviction of sodomy should not be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~.A;;?~ 
STEPHEN MARK STEPHENS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1. hereby· certify that I hand-de 1 i vered a copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Earl Darius, 
Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of August, 1982. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF HOYT GLENNY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
HOYT GLENNY, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
I . 
That the affiant was the Defendant in Case No. 
835, the State of Utah v. Hoyt Glenny, that was tried in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court 1n and for Iron County, State 
of Utah. That this said case 1s presently on appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court as Case No. 18143. 
I I. 
That the affiant had as an attorney in the 
above-·mentioned District Court case Mr. Scott J. Thorley who 
was appointed by the above-mentioned Court to represent the 
affiant in the criminal action which was a case of sodomy. 
I I I. 
That prior to the trial of the affiant, the 
said Scott J. Thorley spent a very minimal and small length 
of time talking to the affiant about this matter, and upon 
reflection, there are matters and things that should have 
been discussed between the affiant and said Scott J. Thorley, 
but due to the short length of time the Defendant had with 
said Scott J. Thorley, these matters ~ever came up, or were 
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never discussed by the affiant and said Scott J. Thorley. 
That these matters include, but are not necessarily relegated 
to, the sexual drive and desires of the affiant and the 
ch~nge of venue from Iron County to a more liberal venue. 
IV. 
That for at least fifteen years prior to 
the date of the alleged offense in question, July 3, 1981, 
the affiant has had no sexual urges or desires. That ~he 
affiant believes that this may be due to the fact that the 
affiant has been a heavy-drinking alcoholic for at least 
fifteen or twenty years prior to July 3, 1981~ In addition, 
if t11ere was any sexual activity that the affiant is so 
d.:~bilitated by emphysema that the affi.ant is unable to have 
r~~'.n.y physical activity without difficulty. 
;·~: 
V. 
Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this ~ day of August, 1982. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this c2? ~day 
of August, 1982. 
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